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Abstract—Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) are attrac-
tive scenarios that can improve the traffic situation and provide
convenient services for drivers and passengers via vehicle-to-
vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communica-
tion. However, there are still many security challenges in the
traffic information transmission, especially in the intense traffic
case. For ensuring the privacy of users and traceability of
vehicles, we propose a traceable concurrent data anonymous
transmission scheme for heterogeneous VANETs. The scheme
is based on certificateless aggregate signcryption, so it sup-
ports batch verification. Moreover, conditional anonymity is
also achieved due to the involving of the pseudo-ID technique.
Furthermore, it is a pairing-free scheme for the merit of multi-
trapdoor hash functions. As a result, the total computation
overhead is greatly reduced.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, VANETs have become more and more widely
used [1] in smart traffic. As a part of the intelligent transporta-
tion system, it can be integrated into IoT and play an important
role to improve traffic conditions in smart city. The entities
in VANETs can exchange information via Dedicated Short
Range Communication (DSRC) or Transport Layer Security
(TLS) protocols in three communication modes including
Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V), Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) and
hybrid mode.
A typical architecture of VANETs, as shown in Fig. 1,
consists of On-Board Units (OBUs), Roadside Units (RSUs)
and trusted authorities (TAs). OBUs embedded with sensors
can identify static information (size, weight, etc. ) and collect
dynamic information of vehicles (speed, direction, etc.). In
addition, as both sources and routers, OBUs are able to send,
receive and forward all kinds of information in VANETs at
any time. RSUs, a kind of infrastructures, are deployed at
roadsides or crossroads. They can communicate with OBUs
via wireless channel, as well as with other RSUs and TAs via
wired channel. TAs are responsible for registering RSUs and
OBUs, tracing vehicles involved in accidents and maintaining
other services in VANETs. Aiming at the issue of the authen-
tication of big data, there have been many batch authentication
schemes specially designed for VANETs [2]–[10].
In 2003, the concept of aggregate signature was first in-
troduced by D. Boneh et al. in [11]. By taking the advan-
TCC
DC
Wired channel
Wireless channel
RSU
RSU
Fig. 1. A Scene of VANETs
tages of certificateless public key cryptosystem (CLC), many
certificateless aggregate signature schemes were proposed
[12], [13]. An identity based aggregate signature scheme
without pairing was then proposed for V2I communication
[8]. In 1997, signcryption was first proposed by Y. Zheng in
[14], which provided both public key encryption and digital
signature in a single logic step. In 2010, Sun et al. proposed
two heterogeneous signcryption schemes [15] that achieved
mutual secure communication between PKI and IBC. It was
the first work on heterogeneous cryptosystem. In 2009, the
first aggregate signcryption was proposed by Selvi et al. in
[16] that reduced computation overhead greatly. It allowed
distinct signcryption cipertexts sent to the same recipient to
be validated only once with the same security level. In recent
years, many aggregate signcryptions have been raised [17]–
[21]. However, the number of aggregate signcryption schemes
is relatively small, in which some issues on security and
efficiency still exist that remain to be solved. In 2015, Chan-
drasekhar et al. proposed an aggregate signcrytion scheme [22]
based on a multi-trapdoor hash function [23].
In this paper, we mainly focus on two types of traffic
data: unencrypted data and encrypted data. The unencrypted
data is usually for vehicles to quickly obtain feedback from
RSUs. The encrypted data is for the IoT data center to prevent
opponents from eavesdropping or abusing these sensitive in-
formation. Unlike the first type of data, the second type of data
often exists in the case of high traffic density. Therefore, based
on an aggregate signcryption scheme with multi-trapdoor hash
function, a secure data transmission scheme was proposed for
V2I scenes. Our contributions are summarized as follows.
1) Our scheme not only achieves batch verification of
vehicles from OBUs to RSUs, but also accomplishes
confidentiality and authentication in a single logic step.
2) Based on multi-trapdoor hash functions, our scheme
only involves scalar multiplications of fixed number
without any bilinear pairing operations.
3) The aggregate verification information could be vali-
dated without the plaintexts and the intended receiver.
Therefore, it wouldn’t take extra computation on de-
cryption, once the batch verification is invalid.
This paper is organized as follows. In section II, we
briefly introduce some preliminaries. In section III, a traceable
concurrent anonymous transmission scheme is constructed
for VANETs. In section IV, we show the superiority of
the proposed scheme by evaluating performance. Finally, the
conclusion is given in section V.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Multi-trapdoor hash functions
Let 〈x, y〉[a,b] denote a set of parameters xi and yi(i ∈
[a, b]), 〈x→ x
′
, y → y
′
〉[a,b]|{i} denote 〈x, y〉[a,b], but the ith
pair 〈xi, yi〉 is updated by a new one. The concept of multi-
trapdoor hash function [22] is described as follows:
Assuming that there exist n participants {ui}
n
i=1, each
of them have their own key pair 〈TKi, HKi〉. HK is the
public key (or hash key) for generating the multi-trapdoor
hash value, and TK is the private key (or trapdoor key)
that is kept securely to generate the multi-trapdoor hash
function collision by its owner. Concretely, each ui takes
a message mi, a random value ri and its public key HKi
as the input, then calculates a multi-trapdoor hash value
TH〈HK〉[1,n](〈m, r〉[1,n]) as the output. In addition, with the
corresponding trapdoor key TKi, another chosen message m
′
i
and a random value r′i, each ui can construct an ephemeral
hash key HK ′i such that TH〈HK〉[1,n](〈m, r〉[1,n]) =
TH〈HK→HK′〉[1,n]|{i}(〈m → m
′, r → r′〉[1,n]|{i}).
When all of the participates generate their collision
parameters respectively, a multi-trapdoor hash collision value
can be calculated, namely TH〈HK〉[1,n](〈m, r〉[1,n]) =
TH〈HK→HK′〉[1,n]|{1,2,3,···,n}(〈m → m
′, r →
r′〉[1,n]|{1,2,3,···,n}).
B. Security Assumptions
LetG be a set of points on an elliptic curve over a finite field
(E/Fq). The security of the proposed scheme is dependent on
the following security assumptions:
Definition 1. Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem
(ECDLP): Let P be a point on an elliptic curve over a finite
field. Given a random instance (P, aP ) for any a ∈ Z∗q , it is
difficult to compute a.
Definition 2. Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem
(CDHP): Let P be a generator of G. Given a random
instance 〈P, aP, bP 〉 for any a, b ∈ Z∗q , it is difficult to
compute abP .
III. THE TRACEABLE CONCURRENT DATA ANONYMOUS
TRANSMISSION SCHEME FOR VANETS
A. System Architecture
Fig. 2 shows the overview of the VANETs system archi-
tecture, including four entities: the OBUs equipped on the
vehicles, the RSUs at the roadside, a trace authority (TRA)
and a key management center (KMC).
The OBUs with constrained computing ability are respon-
sible for transmitting the traffic-related data to the RSUs. The
data should be signcrypted with the parameters stored in a
tamper-proof device (TPD) that ensures the OBUs cannot
be compromised. GPS equipped in OBUs can provide the
precise localization. The RSUs with more computing power
collect the sigcrypted traffic information from vehicles and
unsigncrypt them in an aggregate manner. If the verification
is valid, the RSUs will send feedback to vehicles and forward
the traffic information to the traffic data center. The KMC is
an honest but curious authority that is responsible for issuing
certificates for the RSUs in PKI and generating partial private
keys for vehicles in CLC. Different works [24]–[27] have
studied on the relevant security issues of key management.
Furthermore, in order to achieve conditional anonymity in
smart traffic, the TRA plays the role of a trusted authority
who is in charge of generating the pseudo-ID and tracing
malicious vehicles. Different from OBUs and RSUs that are
online, the KMC and the TRA are offline in the registration
stage and the trace stage respectively. According to the IEEE
802.11p standard, the OBUs and RSUs communicate with
each other via a wireless communication protocol–DSRC,
while the RSUs interact with the traffic data center via a wired
protocol–TLS.
B. Design Goals
To meet the security demands in VANETs, the proposed
scheme can provide the following properties:
• Confidentiality. Before sent to the nearby RSUs, the traf-
fic information from OBUs should be encrypted to keep
the opponents from eavesdropping and analyzing the
further attacks. So, we deploy the aggregate signcryption
scheme as the cryptographic essential for confidentiality.
• Conditional anonymity. The identities of OBUs, such
as the plate number, are often involved in the secure
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Fig. 2. A System Architecture for VANETs
communication between OBUs and RSUs, which might
lead to privacy issues. So it is necessary for OBUs to
adopt the pseudo-IDs of participators instead of the real
identities in the whole protocol.
• Key escrow freeness. Our scheme adopts the certifi-
cateless technique to manage vehicles so that they can
generate their own secret keys, avoiding key escrow
problem.
• Low computational overhead. In general, bilinear pair-
ings are the most time-cost cryptographic operations
in a security protocol. Based on an improved multi-
trapdoor hash function, the proposed scheme achieves
batch verification on the OBUs’ report without pairing
operations, so the performance of the new scheme is
improved greatly.
C. The Protocol
In this section, the traceable concurrent anonymous trans-
mission scheme for heterogeneous VANETs will be intro-
duced in detail. It consists of the following seven phases:
system initialization, pseudo-ID generation, vehicle registra-
tion, RSU registration, RSU broadcast, traffic information
uploading, batch verification and decryption. The detailed
processes are described as follows.
1) System Initialization:
• Both KMC and TRA choose a same elliptic curve E
over a finite field Fq . Let G be an additive group that
consists of the points on E/Fq, P be a generator of G,
O denote infinity, where P 6= O.
• KMC randomly chooses s ∈ Z∗q as its master secret key
and computes Ppub = sP as the master public key.
• TRA randomly chooses β ∈ Z∗q as its secret key and
computes Tpub = βP as its public key.
• Both KMC and TRA choose two one-way crypto-
graphic hash functions: H1 : {0, 1}
∗ → Z∗q , H2 :
{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}lm, where lm denotes the bit length of
the messages.
• KMC publishes the system parameter
params = 〈q, k, E/Fq, G, P, Ppub, Tpub, H1, H2〉.
Note that params will be stored by Vi and RSUs before
their registration.
2) Pseudo-ID Generation:
• Vi randomly chooses λi ∈ Z
∗
q and computes PIDi1 =
λiP as one part of the pseudo-ID of Vi.
• Vi sends 〈RIDi, P IDi1〉 to TRA via a secure channel,
where RIDi is the real identity of Vi.
• TRA computes
PIDi2 = RIDi ⊕H1(βPIDi1, P IDi1, Ti),
where Ti is the period of validity of the pseudo-ID. Then
it sends PIDi = 〈PIDi1, P IDi2, Ti〉 to Vi via a secure
channel, where PIDi2 is the other part of the pseudo-ID
of Vi.
• Vi sets PIDi as its pseudo-ID.
3) Vehicle registration:
• Vi randomly chooses li ∈ Z
∗
q as its secret value and
computes Li = liP .
• KMC randomly chooses ki ∈ Z
∗
q , computes Yi = kiP
as Vi’s partial public key, where Qi = H1(PIDi, Yi),
and computes yi = ki + sQi as Vi’s partial private key.
Finally,KMC sends yi and Yi to Vi via a secure channel.
• Vi sets 〈yi, li〉 as its full private key, 〈Yi, Li〉 as its full
public key.
4) RSU registration:
• R randomly chooses γ ∈ Z∗q and computes its public
key YR = γP . Then, R sends its identity IDR and YR
to KMC via a secure channel.
• KMC generates a certificate certR = 〈IDR, YR, SigR〉
for R, where SigR is a signature signed by KMC’s
master secret key.
• KMC sends certR to R via a secure channel.
5) RSU broadcast: R chooses a public random number η
and generates a digital signature Sig (η, γ, ttR) with its private
key γ, where ttR denotes the timestamp. Then, R constructs
a packet PKT = 〈certR, η, Sig (η, γ, ttR)〉 and broadcasts it
periodically.
6) Traffic Information Uploading:
• When Vi enters into the communication zone of R, it
firstly checks the certR broadcasted by R. If illegal, it
TABLE I
COMPLEXITY COMPARISON
The scheme Cryptosystem Application Signcryption Verification Decryption
J. Kar [18] IBC Theory 1P+2M+3H 2H+4nM nP+nH
Ziba Eslami et al. [19] CLC Theory 1P+3M+2MH+1H (n+3)P+(n+1)MH nP+nM+nH
Y. Han et al. [20] PKI VANETs 3M+1MH+1H (n+1)P+nMH nM+nH
S. Basudan et al. [21] CLC VANETs 7M+3H (n+4)P+nM+(n+1)H 2nM+nH
Ours Heterogeneous VANETs 3M+3H 5M+(3n+1)H nM+nH
aborts. Otherwise, Vi continues to verify if the signature
in the broadcast packet is valid. If not, it aborts. Other-
wise, Vi extracts IDR and YR from certR and goes to
the next step.
• Choose xi ∈ Z
∗
q randomly and compute Xi = xiP .
• Collect traffic information mi and compute ci = mi ⊕
H2(xiYR).
• Compute the ephemeral trapdoor key zi =
η(H1(PIDi, Yi, Li, tti)−H1(ci, Xi, certR, tti))+(yi+
li), where tti denotes the timestamp.
• Compute ti = xi −H1(ηYR)(zi + li).
• Send the signcrypted information
σi = 〈ti, ci, Xi, Yi, Li, P IDi, tti〉
to R.
7) Batch verification and decryption: On receiving sign-
crypted messages σi from Vi, R does as follows:
• Compute Qi = H1 (PIDi, Yi), h3i =
H1(PIDi, Yi, Li, tti) and h4i = H1 (ci, Xi, certR, tti)
for each Vi.
• Compute t =
n∑
i=1
ti, X =
n∑
i=1
Xi, L =
n∑
i=1
Li, where n
denotes the number of vehicles.
• Compute the ephemeral hash key
Z = H−11 (yRηP ) (X − tP )− L.
• Compute the multi-trapdoor hash function value
V1 = η
(
n∑
i=1
h3i
)
P +
n∑
i=1
(Yi + Li).
• Compute the multi-trapdoor collision value
V2 = η
(
n∑
i=1
h4i
)
P + Z −
(
n∑
i=1
Qi
)
Ppub.
• Check if the equation V1 = V2 holds. If not, it aborts.
Otherwise, it goes to the next step.
• Calculate the message mi = ci ⊕H2 (yRXi) of Vi.
D. Correctness
We can validate the correctness of the proposed scheme
through formula derivation below.
V2 = η
(
n∑
i=1
h4i
)
P + Z −
(
n∑
i=1
Qi
)
Ppub
= η
(
n∑
i=1
h4i
)
P +H−11 (yRηP ) (X − tP )
− L−
(
n∑
i=1
Qi
)
Ppub
= η
(
n∑
i=1
h4i
)
P +H−11 (yRηP )
(
n∑
i=1
(xi − ti)
)
P
−
n∑
i=1
Li −
(
n∑
i=1
Qi
)
Ppub
= η
(
n∑
i=1
h4i
)
P +
(
n∑
i=1
(zi + li)
)
P −
n∑
i=1
Li
−
(
n∑
i=1
Qi
)
Ppub
= η
(
n∑
i=1
h4i
)
P +
(
n∑
i=1
(η (h3i − h4i) + yi + li)
)
P
−
(
n∑
i=1
Qi
)
Ppub
=
(
η
n∑
i=1
h3i +
n∑
i=1
(ki + sQi) +
n∑
i=1
li
)
P −
(
n∑
i=1
Qi
)
sP
=
(
η
n∑
i=1
h3i +
n∑
i=1
(ki + li)
)
P
= η
(
n∑
i=1
h3i
)
P +
n∑
i=1
(Yi + Li)
= V1
E. Security analysis
In this section, we will discuss the security properties of
the proposed scheme.
1) Message authentication: In the signcrytion stage, only
the vehicle with the corresponding trapdoor key can generate
an ephemeral trapdoor key, so the adversary cannot forge
a valid signcryption unless he can solve the ECDLP. Fur-
thermore, if the adversary attempts to recover the plaintexts
from an aggregate signcryption, he has to encounter the
CDHP obviously. Hence, our scheme achieves confidentiality,
authentication, integrity and non-repudiation simultaneously.
2) Internal security: None of OBU can impersonate any
other OBUs to forge signcrypted messages, while a RSU
can decrypt the signcrypted messages that are sent to other
RSUs. Furthermore, even the TA cannot forge a valid message
of other entities in VANETs yet, since the certificateless
cryptosystem is adopted in the registration stage. Hence,
internal security is ensured in the proposed scheme.
3) Conditional anonymity: Because the pseudo-ID PIDi
is deployed for each Vi, the adversary cannot obtain any
information about the actual identity RIDi of Vi without the
secret key β of TRA that is used to generate the pseudo-
ID during the data transmission process. If the adversary still
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Fig. 3. Time Consumption on Signcryption
attempts to reveal Vi’s real identity, it has to encounter the
ECDLP that is assumed to be intractable.
4) Traceability: When a dispute on Vi happens, only TRA
can extract the information of the real identity RIDi of Vi by
calculating
RIDi = PIDi2 ⊕H1 (βPIDi1, P IDi1, tti) ,
which can make the traceability available.
5) Unlinkability: We claim that a secure protocol possesses
unlinkability when there is no adversary that can judge if
two different messages are from the same vehicle. Obviously,
the proposed scheme can cover distinct messages by diverse
pseudo-IDs and the corresponding private keys, because vehi-
cles will update pseudo-IDs over a period of time. Therefore,
the adversary cannot link different messages at different times
to a specific vehicle, so that our scheme achieves unlinkability
to a certain extent.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we compare the proposed scheme with
other existing relevant schemes in terms of the computation
overhead. Firstly, for theoretical analysis of computation com-
plexity, let P denote the pairing operation,M denote the scalar
multiplication operation in G1, MH denote the MapToPoint
hash operation, H denote the general hash operation. Note
that other mathematical operations such as additive operations
in G1 are omitted here since their influence is tiny in the
performance evaluation.
As shown in Table I, the proposed scheme does not involve
any pairing operations in all stages and only has five scalar
multiplication operations in the verification stage that are
independent on the number of vehicles, so it achieves the
least cryptographic complexity on the whole compared with
the other four existing schemes, although the number of scalar
multiplication operations in signcryption stage of ours is 2
more than that in Y. Han et al. [20].
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In addition, in order to quantitatively analyze the compu-
tational efficiency of the proposed scheme, the simulation
tests are performed over the type A elliptic curve in Java
Pairing Based Cryptography 2.0.0 with an Intel G640 2.80
GHz processor. According to the results of the execution,
the computational efficiency could be further analyzed. Fig.
3 demonstrates that the proposed scheme has a comparative
advantage over other aggregate signcryption schemes on time-
consumption in the signcryption stage. In Fig. 4, the growing
trend of the computation overhead in our scheme is the lowest
in contrast to other schemes in the verification stage, because
only low-complexity hash operations are associated with the
number of the vehicles in our scheme. Although, in Fig. 5, the
time overhead on decryption is a little more than that in J. Kar
[18], our scheme still achieves better performance than other
schemes at the whole unsigncryption stage, as shown in Fig.
6.The results show that our scheme is much more practical in
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VANETs application scenarios.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, based on an improved aggregate signcryp-
tion scheme with multi-trapdoor hash functions, a traceable
concurrent anonymous transmission scheme for heterogeneous
VANETs was constructed. The confidentiality, integrity, au-
thentication and non-repudiation are all achieved in a single
logic step due to the merits of the aggregate signcryption
algorithm. A pseudonym authority guaranteed the conditional
anonymity of vehicles. Because of CLC cryptosystem is
involved in the registration of vehicles, the heavy burden
of certificate management of the KMC center is lightened.
Most of all, it greatly decreases the computational overhead
in batch verification stage by deploying multi-trapdoor hash
functions instead of bilinear pairings. The proposed scheme
vastly improves the flexibility and practicability of VANETs.
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